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How Privacy Got Its Gender
ANITA

L.

I.

ALLEN AND ERIN MACK*

INTRODUCTION

Like the Olympian Athena, the right to privacy was born not of
woman, but of man. A century ago this year, Samuel D. Warren and
Louis D. Brandeis published The Right to Privacy.' This "most
influential law review article of a11" 2 argued for express recognition
of a new common law right, a right of privacy, protecting the
"inviolate personality" 3 of the individual, the "sacred precincts of
private and domestic life, " 4 and the "robustness of thought and
delicacy of feeling" 5 in society.
The privacy tort was the brainchild of nineteenth-century men of
privilege, and it shows. Harry Kalven noticed it, writing of the Warren
and Brandeis privacy plea that ''there is a curious nineteenth century
quaintness about the grievance, an air of wounded gentility.' ' 6 The
Right to Privacy's quaint gentility reflects not only the economically
privileged perspective of its Harvard Law School-educated authors, 7

* Anita L. Allen is Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center;
J.D ., Harvard Law School; Ph.D ., The University of Michigan. Erin Mack, J.D.,
Georgetown University Law Center, is an Associate at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher.
Professor Allen presented earlier versions of this paper as a keynote address at the
7th Annual National Graduate Women's Studies Conference, University of Pennsylvania, February 23, 1990, and as a Davies Lecture at the University of San Francisco,
April 4, 1990.
I. 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
2. Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW
AND CoNTEMP. PROB. 326, 327 (1966). See generally T. McCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF
PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1.3 (1989).
3. Warren and Brandeis, supra note 1, at 205.
4. !d. at 195.
5. !d. at 196.
6. Kalven, supra note 2, at 329.
7. A native Bostonian, Samuel D. Warren II was the son of a wealthy paper
manufacturer and a member of Boston's social elite. Louis D. Brandeis' immigrant
family owned a small mercantile shop in Louisville. See D. PEMBER, PRIVACY AND
PRESS 21-24 (1972) (describing social backgrounds of Warren and Brandeis).
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but also the pronounced sentimentality 8 and spirituality9 that were
characteristic of the period.
Moreover, as conceived by Warren and Brandeis and initially
applied by the courts, the privacy tort bears the unmistakable mark
of an era of male hegemony. This aspect of the privacy tort has gone
all but unnoticed. Our aim is to suggest that attention to the privacy
tort's social origins in an era of sexual inequality illuminates the
course of its historic development. Scholarly and judicial analyses that
appropriately acknowledge the significance of gender provide an
important direction for the privacy tort's second century.
Part II sets the stage with brief, background perspectives on the
meaning and value of privacy, the public/ private distinction, and the
history of opportunities for personal privacy and autonomous decisionmaking in American life.
Part III examines The Right to Privacy in context, stressing the
outmoded normative assumptions about female modesty and seclusion
implicit in its bid for more legal protection against unwanted publicity.
The monumental legacy of Warren and Brandeis did not include a
broad or egalitarian understanding of the need for privacy.
Part IV offers Charlotte Perkins Gilman's Women and Economics as evidence that such an understanding was within the grasp of

l
I

1

8. See generally A. DoUGLAS, THE FEMINIZATION OF AMERICAN CuLTURE, 6,
12-13, 289 (1976) (historical study of "[t]he minister and the lady" as socially
appointed "champions of sensibility") . Focussing on the country's northeast region,
Douglas identified in nineteenth-century American writing a sentimental emphasis on
spiritual values, often symbolized by images of fair, fragile young women-hence the
"feminization" of culture. According to Douglas, "[t]he sentimentalization of theological and secular culture was an inevitable part of the self-evasion of a society both
committed to laissez-faire industrial expansion and disturbed by its consequences."
Jd. at 12.
9. See generally L. PERRY, INTELLECTUAL LIFE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 263-67,
277-78 (ideology of culture "upheld the far-reaching importance of spiritual values
amid secular change" that included urbanization, industrialization, and "shallow
commercialism"). The ideology culture was a major force in Harvard University
intellectual life when Warren and Brandeis were students there. Id. at 285. NATION
editor E. L. Godkin was a prominent pundit for the ideal of culture. Jd. at 310-11.
Although Warren and Brandeis would deny it fifteen years later, it has been suggested
that an article by Godkin in ScRIBNER's MAGAZINE in July, 1890 condemning press
invasions of privacy inspired The Right to Privacy. See D. PEMBER, supra note 7 at
24-25; and see GoDKIN, infra note 13. See also R. HixsoN, PRIVACY IN A PuBLIC
SociETY: HuMAN RIGHTS IN CoNFLICT 30 (1987) (" [T]here is reason to believe that
Godkin's ScRIBNER's piece , as well as the famous editor's reputation among intellectuals, contributed to their thinking .. . . Indeed, Warren and Brandeis cited Godkin
... in their privacy article.").

.I
l

'l
J.

1
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the late nineteenth-century intellect. 10 An egalitarian understanding of
women's privacy problems is certainly within our reach today. Regrettably, courts and scholars still defend legal privatization of family
life and personal identity without always considering the complex role
that concerns about female modesty and seclusion have had, and
should have, in the law.
Many privacy problems women face as daughters, wives and
mothers cannot be addressed effectively through tort law. Tort law
cannot, for example, create more free time for new mothers. However,
cases highlighted in Part V illustrate that privacy tort actions and
emotional distress actions for "outrageous conduct" can potentially
right privacy wrongs. Existing categories of privacy torts potentially
have one of their most worthwhile applications as aids to female
victims of gender-related privacy invasions. Stereotypes of heightened
female modesty undermined the nominal victories of female privacy
claimants in the decades immediately following The Right to Privacy.
The cases we consider in Part V suggest that, despite origins in
nineteenth-century gender bias, the privacy torts most states recognize
can help to validate women's economic and dignitarian interests m
freedom from physical and emotional abuse in the workplace.

II.
A.

CONCEPT AND VALUE

Personal privacy exists wherever a degree of inaccessibility shelters persons or information about them from others. 11 Seclusion,
solitude, anonymity, secrecy, confidentiality, and reserve are discrete
forms of privacy . 12 While privacy is a phenomenon in every human
10. C. PERKINS GILMAN, WOMEN AND ECONOMICS: A STUDY OF THE ECONOMIC
RELATION BETWEEN MEN AND WOMEN AS A FACTOR IN SOCIAL EVOLUTION (1898).
11. See generally A. ALLEN, UNEASY AccEss: PRIVACY FOR WoMEN IN A FREE
SociETY 11, 15 (1988) (analyzing competing philosophical definitions of "privacy")
("While no definition of 'privacy' is universally accepted, definitions in which the
concept of access play a role have become increasingly commonplace . . . . To say
that a person possesses or enjoys privacy is to say that, in some respect and to some
extent, the person (or the person's mental state or information about the person) is
beyond the range of others' five senses and any devices that can enhance, reveal,
trace or record human conduct, thought, belief or emotion.") . Cf. Post, Th e Social
Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CALIF.
L. REv. 957, 969 (1989) (concept of privacy underlying privacy tort not neutral,
descriptive , or value free).
12. A. ALLEN, supra note 11, at 18 ("Privacy is best viewed as a kind of parent
or umbrella concept to those ... [concepts such as seclusion, solitude, anonymity,
confidentiality, secrecy, intimacy and/ or reserve] that denote a person's conditions
of inaccessibility to the senses and surveillance devices of others.").
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society, its availability and perceived value vary with culture, economy, status, age, and gender. 13 Gender is a key social variable in the
availability of certain forms of individual and group privacy . 14 Social
scientist Barrington Moore suggests that in many cultures men achieve
privacy at the expense of privacy-deficient women, whose domestic
labor maintains patriarchic havens. 15
Of special interest here , gender is also an important variable in
how much value a society places on modesty, a form of reserve. 16
Modesty consists of acts of refraining from ostentation and selfpraise. Traditional norms of female modesty in American culture
required that women, much more than men, exhibit speech , dress ,
and behavior calculated to deflect attention from their bodies, vi ews ,
or desi res . Needless to say, expectations of female self-concealment
and seclusion in the name of modesty have greatly diminished. But
nineteenth-century women faced condemnation for immodesty when
they sought the services of male physicians and lawyers, spoke publicly
about politics, entered beauty contests, and pursued careers in medicine or as clergy. 17 Activist Elizabeth Cady Stanton criticized the
socialites of her day, who attended balls in strapless gowns and
danced in the arms of strangers, but balked at the immodesty of
speaking out for women's rights in public places . 18
Conditions of privacy are not always morally praiseworthy or
psychologically desirable. Yet it is difficult to deny that meaningful
forms of individual privacy empower persons and enhance their
intimate relationships . 19 Moreover, because the well-being of a family
13 . ALAN F. WESTIN, PRrvACY AND FREEDOM 13 (1967). But see Godkin, The
Rights of the Citizen: To His Reputation, 8 SCRIBNER's MAGAZINE 58, 65 (1890)
("Privacy is ... one of the luxuries of civilization, which is not only unsought for
but unknown in primitive or barbarous societies. The savage cannot have privacy,
and does not desire or dream of it."). Warren and Brandeis cited the Godkin article
with apparent approval. See Warren and Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195.
14. Cj. Roberts and Gregor, Privacy: A Cultural View, in PRrvACY, 182, 210
(J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman ed. 1971).
15. B. MooRE, PRrvACY: STUDIES IN SociAL AND CuLTURAL HISTORY 51-52

(1984) .
16. A. ALLE N, supra note 11, at 19.
17. !d. at 20. Cj. P. GLAZER and M. SLATER, UNEQUAL CoLLEAGUES: THE
ENTRANCE OF WOMEN INTO THE PROFESSIONS, 1890-1940 12-13 , 81 (1987) ("The
m edical training mean t that she had to violate Victorian standards of female modesty
regarding bodily functions."); L. BANNER, AMERICAN BEAUTY: A SOCIAL HISTORY
255 -57 (1983) (middle-class morality initially hostile to women on di splay in commercial beauty contests).
18 . A . ALLEN, supra note 11 at 20.
19. !d. at 45-52.
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or community is a function of the well-being of its members, privacy
can make a man or woman more fit for group contribution and
participation. 20 According to some psychologists, privacy promotes
beneficial states and activities. Self-reflection, imagination, and relaxation are but a few of the valued results of privacy. 21 Privacy is also
thought to foster individuality and the autonomy of judgment presupposed by western morality and liberalism. 22 Although personal privacy
is occasionally condemned categorically as furthering indifference,
social alienation, and inefficiency, philosophers typically praise diverse
forms of individual, corporate , and group privacy for their functional
utility and moral value. 23
B.

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE

"Privacy" denotes conditions of physical or informational inaccessibility, such as solitude or secrecy. But it can also designate ''the
private sphere'' and a degree of autonomy within it. The existence of
privacy does not presuppose the existence of a private sphere; nonetheless the concept of privacy is often associated with the concept of
a private sphere constituted by lives free of unwanted governmental
and community interference. Our homes, families, sexuality, and
friendships are deemed appropriately private affairs. Religion, education, and business are sometimes included among the appropriately
private aspects of human society as well.
In The Human Condition, Hannah Arendt explained that the
public/private distinction has been a feature of Western thought at
least since the rise of the ancient city-state, when it denoted the
political and household realms, respectively. 24 In Greek and classical
Roman thought, the private sphere of the household was viewed as a
sphere of necessity in which the dominant male of the family ruled
over wife, children, and servants who were engaged in mutual efforts

20. !d.
21. See, e.g., A. Buss, SELF-CONSCIOUSNESs AND SociAL ANXIETY (1980); T.
MILBURN and K. WATMAN, ON THE NATURE OF THREAT: A SociAL PsYCHOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS (1981); C. Schneider, SHAME , EXPOSURE AND PRIVACY (1977); S. SEAGERT,
CROWDING IN REAL ENVIRONMENTS (1976). See also A. ALLEN, supra note II, at 45.
22. A. ALLEN, supra note II, at 48. Cf. Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102
HARv. L. REv. 737, 805 (1989) (liberal privacy rights protect against totalitarian
regulation).
23. !d. at 41-53.
24. H. ARENDT, THE HuMAN CoNDITION 28 (1958). For a quite different
presentation of the same history, see J. HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION
OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE: AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY, 2, 3
(1989) (T. Burger trans. 1962).
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for survival. By contrast, the public sphere was seen as a sphere of
freedom where men of virtue, who had mastered the private sphere,
joined forces as equals and citizens to govern and defend their
communities.
With respect to the United States and, indeed, the modern world
in general, it is impossible to make a sharp distinction between the
public and the private. Few aspects of contemporary American life
are plausibly deemed wholly beyond public regulation. For example,
because homosexual marriages are prohibited, marriage cannot be
viewed as a wholly private matter between consenting adults. Child
abuse and neglect statutes and the law of child custody reveal that
childrearing is very much a matter of public regulation. The demarcation of public and private that may have once characterized the
city-state does not apply as a description or ideal for the contemporary
nation-state. The public and private are now merged into what Arendt
usefully distinguished as a "social realm. " 25 Government and community have taken on some of the protective attributes of the family.
At the same time, women, children, and laborers have progressed
toward the privileges and responsibilities of citizenship.
The idea of a social realm better describes the actual organization
of American society than dichotomies of public and private. However,
normative conceptions of public and private serve as powerful reminders of the still prevalent need to limit the reach of group life. The
public/private distinction and the notion of appropriately public and
private spheres persist in debates over the limits of collective regulation. They persist dramatically in debates over the rights of women,
as exemplified by the current abortion law controversies.
In the nineteenth century, the ideology of "true womanhood"
and the "cult of domesticity" justified the confinement of women in
the private household as subservient caretakers. 26 Middle-class white
women often had a great deal of privacy, in the sense of socially
imposed isolation within a private household. However, across races
and classes, women were seldom heads of households, had little time
to themselves, and had little of the legal autonomy concerning sexuality, marriage, and the family that sometimes is called "decisional
privacy'' today. 27

25.
26.
HISTORY
as much
27.

ARENDT, supra note 24 at 68-72.
A. Allen, supra note 11, at 65. But see L. NICHOLSON, GENDER AND
62 (1986) ("ideal of female domesticity in the nineteenth century never had
relevance for black people as for middle class white people.").
Reacting to this tradition, feminists and other progressive thinkers have
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WOMEN'S PRIVACY HERITAGE

A look at social history from the American colonial era to 1890
when Warren and Brandeis published The Right to Privacy gives rise
to three important points about the period. First, physical and informational forms of privacy were within the reach of many women as
incidents to rural or small-town life, or as required by norms of
female modesty and domesticity. Second , women ' s physical seclusion
within the home did not guarantee meaningful for ms of individual
privacy. The demands of childreari ng, nursing , and housekeeping
meant little independence or time alone . Third, women's privacy in
the sense of autonomous decisionm aki ng (even about domestic matters) was closely circumscribed by legal and other social norms. By
virtue of these conditions, both from our perspective in the 1990s and
that of feminist Charlotte Perkins Gilman in the 1890s, women's
privacy was problematic.
1.

Pre-Industrial and Rural Life

Privacy was valued in colonial America for many of the same
reasons it is valued today. Centuries prior to the arrival of the
colonists, "privacy" was used in the English language to denote "the
state or condition of being withdrawn from the society of others, or
from public interest. " 28 The value of privacy as the state of withdrawal
from the public sphere was echoed in church commands to carry on
devotions ''with all possible Privacy and Modesty,' ' 29 and to keep
prayer "publick [sic] in the Congregation, private in the Family, and
secret in the Closet. " 30 While privacy per se was not expressly recognized as the basis of a legal right in colonial America, privacy did
play a part in custom and legal practice. In fact, the colonial legal
system protected physical and informational privacy by limiting searches
and seizures, prosecuting trespassers, hearing defamation cases, and

sometimes equated the concepts of privacy and the private sphere with fem al e
subjugation . See generally ALLEN, supra note 11, at 45 -56, 72-75 (stressing the equalit y
of men's and women's normative moral entitlement to individual modes of priv acy
and autonomous decisionmaking). One feminist purported to rej ect the legal categories of privacy and the private sphere as "male ideology ." See C. MACKINNON,
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 53 (1988). Recognizing a "debt to nurture," another has called
for the restructuring of the private through forms of family li fe that do not "repeat
the earlier terms of female oppression. " J. ELSHTAIN, PUBLIC MAN, PRIVATE WOMAN
322-53 (1981).
28. D . FLAHERTY, PRIVACY IN CoLONIAL NEw ENGLAND 10 (1972).
29. !d.
30. !d. at 11-12.
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protecting privileged husband and wife communications in the courtroom. 31
Yet, the colonial lifestyle "left little room for privacy or nonconformity even among the free and affluent. " 32 The community
spirit ran strong in the colonies and there was a pervasive belief that
individuals and families should make sacrifices for the good of the
community. Norms of mutual surveillance enforced by officials constrained di sorderliness and moral deviance. 33
However , the threat to privacy posed by government control was
lessened by lax enforcement and respect for social relationships that
were enhanced by privacy, such as courtship Y Res pect for the family
also undercut public regulation. The family household-often an
extended conglomeration of spouses, children, servants, apprentices,
and other dependents-was governed by male patriarchs. 35 The community delegated to men the authority to control those living within
their domain and all family property. While appointed community
officials were expected to insure families' conformity to public standards, landed males as heads of families were expected to maintain
well-ordered and well-governed households. The structure of the
colonial family thus mirrored the structure of the larger society; both
were interdependent, hierarchical, and patriarchal.3 6
American colonial life centered around an agrarian and mercantile economy. It generally featured rural homesteads and sparsely
populated towns. In rural areas, a large homestead built on several
acres could be the common home of parents, married children, and
employees, all subject to masculine family authority. In the towns, a
male head of household often maintained a work area or business
next to his home. Families tended to be large and households often
included one or more domestic servants, apprentices, and other dependent workers.
There was little rigid delineation of responsibilities and duties
within many early American homes. Rural life and interdependence
among family members offered free colonial women many rights and

31. !d. at 248.
32. S. KENNEDY, IF Au WE Dro WAs TO WEEP AT Ho ME: A HI STORY OF WHITE
WORKING-CLASS WOMEN IN MODERN AMERICA 8 (1979) .
33. FLAHE RTY, supra note 28, at 248.
34. !d.
35. !d.
36. M. GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND FAMILY IN NINETEE NTHCENTURY AMERICA 6 (1985).
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liberties that women in other countries did not enjoy Y Yet, throu ghout the pre-industrial period, women remained subordinate and dependent in caretaking roles. The multitudes of women who liv ed as
slaves or servants enjoyed the least privacy and autonomy of all.
However , even free, working white women were short on privacy and
independence. 38

2.

Age of Industry

Concern for privacy and privacy-related liberties achieved prominence as public issues in the nineteenth century when a sharp increase
in technology and industrialization had begun to transform the agrarian and mercantile culture to one of urban capitalism. A mar ked
growth in commerce and industry meant more people could work for
pay and no longer had to rely on farming or apprenticing to earn a
living. The home workshop was rendered virtually obsolete, and male
breadwinners moved their trades into the urban centers that were
rapidly springing up to accommodate large-scale mechanization and
a growing labor force. 39
Households declined in size in some social strata. Several factors
worked to decrease the size of the average professional worker's
household, including the greatly reduced need for apprentices and
journeymen workers, the technological advances in home appliances
that made a large force of domestic servants unnecessary, and the
lack of housing in urban centers that would accommodate extended
families. These demographic forces combined with republican 40 and

37. !d.
38. Cf. S. KENNEDY, supra note 32, at 36-37 (lives of white women who worked
in mills and as live-in domestics strictly controlled and scrutinized) .
39. M. RYAN, CRADLE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS: THE FAMILY IN ONEIDA COUNTY,
NEW YORK, 1790-1865 147 (1981).
40. M. GRossBERG, supra note 36, at 6-7. A notable feature of the republican
ideology of post-Revolutionary American society was the idea that the preservation
of the public good was the most important goal of a political society, and that this
goal was attained through virtuous citizens who were willing to sacrifice individual
interests to the needs of the public good, were independent of the political will of
others, and who participated in politics and actively exercised their citizenship. But
see L. PERRY, supra note 9, at 263 ("[B]y the latter half of the nineteenth century
.. . [culture] served, much as virtue had done, to designate higher ideals that mu st
shine atop the republic.") To these concepts could be added equality , in the sense
that all citizens were entitled to representation in the civil and political process under
a democratic system of laws. Pocock, Virtue and Commerce in the Eighteenth
Century, 3 J.I.H. 119-34 (1972), cited in S. WILENTZ, CHANTS DEMOCRATIC: NEw
YORK CITY & THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN WoRKING CLASS, 1788-1850 14 (1984).
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laissez-faire 41 sentiments to create the social, political and legal structures of the nineteenth century.
The impact of industrialization on privacy and autonomy resists
easy summation. According to Alan F. Westin, nuclear family lifestyles , mobility in work and residence, and the decline of religious
authority meant "greater situations of physical and psychological
privacy.' ' 42 While Westin associated urban industrialization with more
privacy, Robert Copple recently associated the same developments
with less privacy. Cop ple cited the convergence of the growth of cities
that accompanied industrialization with the closing of the western
fronti er as a possible explanation for the emergence of articulated
public concern about lost privacy during the late nineteenth century. 43
It should be noted that, although personal privacy was not a
salient issue in public life for most of the nineteenth century, it could
be an acute concern in private life. For example, as revealed in period
diaries , the gro up life required by safe westward passage imposed
privacy-related hardships on women who were forced to depart abruptly
from standards of female modesty and seclusion. 44 The biographies
of African-American slaves reflect extremes of humiliation and shame
suffered by women reared as Christians but treated as chattel unsuited
for privacy and private choice. 45 Thus, neither the end of the westward

41. M . RYAN, supra note 39, at 150-54.
42. A. WESTIN, supra note 13, at 21. But see A. ALLEN, supra note 11, at 66
(privacy also a function of character of life within nuclear family home).
43. Copple, Privacy and the Frontier Thesis: An American Intersection of Self
and Society, 34 AM. J. JuRIS. 87, 88 (1989) ("threat to frontier values of individualism
and autonomy . . . [where an] impetus for the creation and adoption of . . . legal
means to protect personal privacy and to officially recognize the right to a .. . degree
of social distance").
44. The journals kept by women on the overland trails document quotidian
features of their arduous treks across the continent in the company of many men
and few other women. The demanding realities of daily life included cooking,
washing, cleaning, gathering herbs and berries, looking after small children, and
caring for the sick and dying. L. SCHLISSEL, WOMEN'S DIARIES OF THE WESTWARD
JouRNEY 77 (1982). Women who travelled alone with groups of men wrote of a
profound sense of isolation at the loss of female friendship, conversation, and coworkers. !d. at 98. The lack of shelter on the trail compromised their modesty
concerns by exposing bodily functions such as excretion and menstruation. At least
women travelling together could "provide a measure of propriety to a sister on the
Trail" by extending their long skirts to act as a screen, creating a "curtain of
modesty" for an otherwise embarrassing situation. !d.
45. See, e.g., 0. ALBERT, THE HousE OF BoNDAGE (1988); Srx WoMEN's SLAVE
NARRATIVES (H. Gates ed. 1988) (collection of nineteenth-century slave narratives).
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expansion Copple stressed, nor the growth of photography and "yellow journalism" Warren and Brandeis decried, 46 began Americans'
concerns about their privacy.
Compared to the women of the 1820s, who "had neither legal,
professional nor ed ucational standing,'' the women of 1890 were
seemingly on the road to equality. 47 Yet, the second half of the
nineteenth century brought increased legal regulation of the "private
sphere" of marriage, reproduction, and family life. As a consequence
of legal expansion, when male freedom and self-reliance were held
high as esteemed public values, the decisions of women concerning
marriage, pregnancy , divorce, and child-rearing were subjected to new
public scrutiny and regulation. 48 The Congressional passage of the
Comstock Law in 1873 has come to symbolize the period. 49 Whether
male or female, Victorian reformers often made no distinction between
social concerns such as communicable diseases on the one hand, and
moral concerns over women's exercise of reproductive autonomy on
the other. Mid-century American society rested on the central tenets
of ''permanency of marriage, the sacredness of the home, and the
dependence of civilized life upon the family." 50 Early writers told of
the ills that would befall the nation if families failed to promote
"industry, frugality, temperance, moderation, and the whole lovely
46. Warren and Brandeis, supra note 1, at 196.
47. L. BANNER, WOMEN IN MODERN AMERICA: A BRIEF HISTORY 22 (1984).
48. Family law historian Michael Grossberg attributed increased interest in
"governing the hearth" to a fervent family reform movement. The movement arose,
he argued, when individualism and diversity were perceived as a threat to an ideal he
called the "republican family ." M. GRossBERG, supra note 36, at 10-11. Grossberg
maintained that in the republican family, the colonial rule of status and unquestioning
obedience among family members was replaced by affection, respect, and reciprocity.
Relationships were largely seen in contractual terms that stressed "voluntary consent,
reciprocal duties, and the possibility of dissolution." Yet the perception of marriage
as a contract called for a delineation of household and economic responsibilities
among the sexes. Males were generally charged with supporting the family. For the
female, the home became her "exclusive domain," and domesticity her most outstanding attribute. !d. at 6-7. Grossberg maintained that, as the republican family
ideal gained ground, the faces of individualism and laissez-faire economics were
treating diversity and deviations within and among families . Public concerns for the
stability and well-being of the family contributed to a family reform movement that
swept the nation, preaching paternalism, sexual restraint, and a strict economic
division by labor. !d. at I 0-11.
49. Act of 3 March 1873, 17 Stat. 258, amended, Act of 12 July 1876, 19 Stat.
186. Named after Anthony Comstock, the Comstock Law and the copycat state laws
it spawned banned pornography, abortion and contraception devices. See BANNER,
supra note 47, at 16.
50 . !d.
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train of republican virtues. " 5 1 For reasons about which historians
sometimes disagree, it became the perceived responsibility of women
to safeguard and promote the highest ideals in their homes and
children so as to keep society in tact. 52
According to Michael Grossberg-whose account of history may
overstate the pervasiveness and ega litarianism of the republican family, and the novelty of legal pat riarchy-popular obsession with family
integrity led to the enactment of major new legislation governing the
hearth. The law of the second hal f of th e last century thereby created
an unprecedented judicial patriarchy overseeing the household. Given
added authority to determine the legal status and abilities of married
women and other family member s, nineteenth-century judges further
perpetuated patriarchic authority. T hey wielded control over marriage
and other domestic matters, as evid en ced by the law of courtship,
nuptials, and domestic conduct. T he common law notion of parens
patriae gave the courts power to enter even the most private aspects
of family life. Grossberg concluded that the judicial acquisition and
exercise of patriarchal authority ''stemmed from the traditional assumption that married women lacked the economic and intellectual
independence to act without male supervision (and thus needed special
protection), combined with the new faith in separate and mutually
exclusive spheres ... central to the organization of the republican
family. " 53
The law of domestic relations resulted in a janus-faced policy.
With a view toward female protection, judges could rationalize rewarding women who successfully carried out their caretaking and
household duties, and assisting women when problems arose during
courtship and marriage. With a view toward female control, judges
also could rationalize "invoking their authority to check radical
alterations in the subordinate legal status of women. " 54 On Grossberg's account, then, judicial patriarchy in domestic law ensured
continuing paternal control and governance of the home. If paternal

51. !d. at 10.
52 . Grossberg's account stressed "republican" values, but Ann Douglas stressed
"sentimentalization." See A. DouGLAS, supra note 8, at 6-13. Echoing the mind-set
Douglas identified, one legal writer announced that "[w]oman is generally conceded
to be superior to man in beauty, sweet ness , tenderness, parental care of children,
virtue, sympathetic response, capacity to endure physical pain, home-making, refining
influence on civilization and general moral and cultural excellence." Puller , When
Equal Rights are Unequal, 13 VA. L. REv . 619, 629 (1927).
53. M. Grossberg, supra note 36, at 300.
54. Id. at 301 .
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control over the family broke down, the judicial pat riarchy was there
to take its place. Partly as a result of their own reformist activism, 55
nineteenth-century women gained a greater presence in domestic relations law. But they were not given the type of legal powers that
brought greater economic, social, or political power inside or outside
the home.
3.

Th e First Privacy Tort

T he assumption that women are properly dependent and confined
to domestic roles had a corollary : women were deemed to be creatures
of special modesty. Not only were women expected to observe conventional rituals of modesty, as a prerequisite of virtue or respectability; but others similarly were expected to limit their encounters with
women as modesty demanded . Women who worked outside the home
or participated in public life could easily have their virtue thrown into
question. 56 Anyone taking liberties with respectable women were subject to social sanction. These facts of social life were reflected in the
development of the privacy tort.
The standard of female modesty and seclusion was apparent in a
much-cited Michigan case that predated the Warren and Brandeis
article by nine years, De May v. RobertsY The facts of the case were
simple. A poor, married couple invited a physician to their home to
assist them and a midwife in the delivery of their child. Because the
night was "dark and stormy, " 58 the physician brought along Scattergood, an "unprofessional young unmarried man, " 59 to carry his
umbrella, lantern, and other necessary items. 60 Scattergood was present in the Roberts' tiny house throughout the protracted labor. At
the doctor's request, Scattergood held Mrs. Roberts' hand "during a
paroxysm of pain. " 61

55 . L. BANNER, supra note 47, at 16, 18-22.
56 . See A. ALLEN, supra note 11, at 65. In a lecture entitled "Of Queen's
Gardens" the poet John Ruskin essayed that "the woman's true pl ace " is the home,
" the place of peace, the shelter . . . from all terror, doubt, and di vision. [In the
sanctuary of the home] the woman must be enduringly, incorruptibly good, instinctively, infallibly ... wise, not for self-development, but for self-renunciation: wise
... with modesty of service." Id. Middle-class moralizers of both sexes viewed poor,
immigrant and black wom en who were forced to work outside the home as falling
short of the feminine ideal.
57. 46 Mich. 160, 9 N.W. 146 (18 81).
58 . Id . at 162, 9 N.W. at 147.
59. Jd. at 165, 9 N .W. at 148.
60. Id. at 165, 9 N.W. at 147 .
61. Id .
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Some time after the birthing, the Robertses learned that Scattergood was not a medical practitioner. They filed a lawsuit against both
Scattergood and Dr. De May. The jury award ed damages and the
defendants appealed . Announcing that "[i]t would be shocking to our
sense of right, justice and propriety to doubt ... that ... the law
wo uld afford an ample remedy, " 62 the court affirmed the findin g that
the defendants were guilty of deceit, and sustained the dam ages fo r
Mrs . Roberts' "shame and mortification. " 63
The court ' s declaration that "the plaintiff haC! a legal right to
the privacy of her apartment" 64 was a first in American privacy
jurisprudence. Edward J. Blaustein's anachronistic reading of De !Way
as judicial vindication of women's "individuality and digni ty, " 65
missed an important dimension of the case. A closer look at its social
context suggests that the case is better viewed as a vindication of
women's modesty. For, absent exceedingly strong female modesty and
seclusion standards, it is difficult to explain why Mr. Scattergood and
Dr. De May should have been liable at all.
Bad weather, combined with Dr. De May's illness and fatigue ,
led him to bring Scattergood along. Those same conditions necessitated that Scattergood remain in the plaintiffs' fourteen-by-sixteen
foot house for the delivery. The court's decision implied that not even
an exigent circumstance-a virtual emergency-can convert what is
otherwise an invasion of privacy accomplished through deceit into
privileged conduct. And, the court found deceit where arguably there
was none. The case for deceit was not strong. De May expressly
introduced Scattergood to the Robertses as a friend brought along to
carry his things , not as a medical student or doctor. Nonetheless, the
court concluded, as a matter of law, that the Robertses had a right
to presume that a doctor would not bring an unmarried young man
who was not a medical professional to the scene of a delivery .
Strict ad herence to a social standard of female seclusion and
modesty is reflected in the court's conclusion as well as in its repetition
of the adjective grouping "unprofessional, unmarried and young,"
when describing Scattergood . One is led to speculate that De May
might have escaped liability by bringing along an old, married man
to carry his things. In that case, the affront to the husb and's household authority and the woman's presumed modesty would have been
62. Id. at 166, 9 N.W . at 148-49.
63. Id. at 167, 9 N .W. at 149.
64. Jd.
65. E. Blaustein , Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An A nswer to Dean
Prosser, 39 N.Y .U. L. REv. 962, 973 (1964).
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less severe. A young man or a young, unmarried man-unlike an old,
married man-is a potential seducer. These considerations suggest
that Blaustein's analysis of De A1ay as vindicating individuality and
dignity is, at best, part of the truth. 66 It was mainly because women
were deemed to be creatures of special modesty and their husbands
their rightful protectors that the court found for the Robertses . Both
in the elite urban East and the rural Mid-west, respect for women 's
dignity consisted of respect for their modesty and other feminine
virtues. The notion that female dignity required individuality belonged
scarcely to the period at allY

III.
A.

UNDERSTANDING "THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY"

In The Right to Privacy, Warren and Brandeis contended that
political, social, and economic changes had created a category of
emotional or spiritual injury inadequately addressed by the law: the
invasion of privacy. 68 The article depicted the invasion of privacy as
an increasingly common consequence of both a flourishing urban free
press, and the unauthorized circulation and publication of photographs produced with new technology.
Warren and Brandeis argued that every man [sic] needs a place
of solitude, a retreat from the "intensity and complexity of life, " 69 a
sanctuary beyond the reach of scurrilous journalism, curiosity-seekers,
gossips, and the prurient interests of the indolent public. 70 The famous
coauthors urged that the right "to be let alone, " 71 the right of privacy,

66. Blaustein inadvertently ascribed privacy a masculine gender even as he
attempted to celebrate it as a human right. Relying heavily on masculine rhetoric, he
wrote: "A man whose home may be entered at the will of another, whose conversations may be overheard at the will of another, whose marital and familial intimacies
may be overseen at the will of another is less than a man, has less . .. dignity, on
that account." E. Blaustein, supra note 65, at 973-74 (emphasis added). Blaustein
also suggested that "what provoked Warren and Brandeis to write their article was
a fear that a rampant press feeding on the stuff of private life would destroy
individual dignity and integrity and emasculate individual freedom." !d. at 971
(emphasis added) .
67 . Cf. L. BAN NER, supra note 47, at I ("The 1890s were years of transition .... But in every area of women's experience discrimination still existed.")
68 . Warren and Brandeis, supra note I, at 193, 195, 196, 197.
69 . !d. at 196.
70. !d.
71. !d. at 195.
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should be recognized to vouchsafe "inviolate personality, " 72 the "sacred precincts of private and domestic life" 73 and the "robustness of
thought and delicacy of feeling" in society. 74 Injuries to personality
arising by virtue of acts ''overstepping ... the obvious bounds of
propriety and of decency" 75 should be compensable, they argued,
much as physical injury to body and property, interference with the
peaceful use and enjoyment of property, and damage to reputation ,
family relations , and feelings were already legally compensable.
Overwrought by today's standards, the Warren and Brandeis
article was a lofty defense of values of affluence and gentility. 76 The
article's proposal for a privacy tort grounded on human spirituality
reflected the ''ideology of culture'' that once played a major role in
the intellectual life of the American Northeast. 77 Culture stood in
opposition to the supposed crass effects of commerce and industry
on the human spirit. One noted advocate of the standard of culture,
E. L. Godkin, published an attack on journalistic invasions of privacy
in 1890 in Scribner's Magazine. Godkin's article appeared just months
before Warren and Brandeis published theirs; 78 The Right to Privacy
cited Godkin's article and may have been influenced by it. 79
Like Godkin, Warren and Brandeis reacted with disfavor to uses
of journalism and photography that, while commonplace today, were
once novel and widely criticized. Indeed, the development of the
halftone plate that permitted the reproduction of photographs in
newspapers in the 1880s led the way in the 1890s to gimmicks and
spectacles, including beauty contests sponsored by circus entrepreneurs
and mass circulation newspapers "whose editors boldly utilized sex
and violence as part of their appeal.' ' 80 The commercial exploitation
of female beauty was a development initially fought by the middleand upper-classes. 81 In the age of culture, commercial displays of
72. !d. at 205 .
73. !d. at 195.
74. !d. at 196.
75. !d.
76. Kalven, supra note 2, at 329.
77. L. PERRY, supra note 9, at 263-67, 277-78.
78. Godkin, The Rights of the Citizen: To His Reputation, 8 ScRIBNER's
MAGAZINE 58, 65 (1890).
79. Warren and Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195 n. 6. But see D. PEMBER , supra
note 7, at 24. Brandeis wrote to Warren in 1905 that: "My own recollection is that
it was not Godkin's article but a specific suggestion of yours, as well as your deepest
abhorrence of the invasions of social privacy, which led to our taking up the inquiry ."
Warren concurred. !d.
80. L. BANNER, supra note 17, at 256-57.
81. !d. at 255.
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women would have been difficult to reconcile with reigning myths of
female moral superiority, spiritual leadership and heightened sensibilities.82
Personal experiences with unwanted publicity concerning his Boston Brahmin family's social life may have prompted Warren to
coauthor the famous article. 83 Whatever its immediate causes, the
article has had a decided impact on positive tort law. 84 The article
also has had an impact on legal scholarship, setting into motion one
hundred years of debate over the meaning and value of privacy, and
the feasibility of protecting privacy through private and public law.
Praised for its role in helping courts to recognize that "privacy
[is] an aspect of human dignity , " 85 the Warren and Brandeis article
has been roundly criticized in recent decades as narrow and anachronistic . Critics say Warren and Brandeis spawned a petty, duplicative,
and constitutionally problematic tort that has proven to be useless to
plaintiffs and to society. 86 Without regard to the overall usefulness
and constitutionality of the torts it spawned, the article can be
criticized for inadequately addressing women's privacy and its historically problematic character. Warren and Brandeis employed language
and arguments that perpetuated in the law the ideal of the cloistered
lady.
B.

A FRESH LOOK

Scholarly analyses traditionally focus on the large number of
copyright and literary property cases Warren and Brandeis cited. 87
This focus is substantially warranted. Pressing that sensibilities and
self-regard are the touchstones of the inviolate personality, Warren

82. See generally A. DouGLAS, supra note 8, at 6, 12-13; M . VrcrNus, INDEPENDENT WoMEN: 1860- 1920 4, 5 (1985).
83. See, e.g., Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 383 (1960). But see T.
McCARTHY, supra note 2 (casting doubt on claim that Warren's anger over press
intrusion in own life motivated article).
84. The article is cited in virtually every case utilized by the highest state courts
as a vehicle for recognizing or refusing to recognize privacy rights. For a convenient
list of these cases, see Copple, supra note 43, at 126-131. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 652A (1977) credits the Warren and Brandeis article with originating the
privacy tort.
85. See generally E . Bloustein, supra note 65.
86. See generally Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to
Warren and Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CoRNELL L. REv. 291 (1983) (plaintiffs
seldom win and tort largely duplicative and constitutionally problematic); Kalven,
supra note 2 (tort is petty, duplicative and constitutionally problematic).
87. D. PEMBER , supra note 7, at 44-52.
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and Brandeis arrived at the legal basis for a general substantive law
of privacy partly by drawing analogies to American and English
judicial opinions, holding that individuals have property rights and
contractual claims attached to the letters they send, the art they
produce, and to the negatives and originals of their photographs.
However, commentators' traditional focus obscures the extent to
which the rhetorical force of the article stems from Warren and
Brandeis' skillful exploitation of social attitudes about gender. To see
this, it is necessary to focus on aspects of The Right to Privacy that
may first appear incidental. The story that Warren and Brandeis told
about the "inevitable" 88 progressive development of the rights in
civilized society described the broadening of the right to life from the
narrow conception of noninterference with body and property to the
noninterference with a man's "family relations. " 89 To argue t hat the
law had already begun to make progress in the direction of recognizing
the compensability of offenses to our spiritual natures, they cited a
line of cases in which parents and husbands were held to have had
rights of recovery against male seducers. Their recognition of an
historical "regard for human emotions" 90 was based on cases in which
remedies were granted for the alienation of a wife's affections 91 and
for wounded feelings, such as shame and dishonor, caused by a
daughter's seduction. 92 In addition, they relied on Godkin's Scribner's

88. Warren and Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195.
89. /d. at 194.
90. !d.
91. Winsmore v. Greenbank, Willes 577 (1745). Plaintiff's wife had left him
"unlawfully." During their separation, after inheriting her father's fortune, she died.
Plaintiff husband alleged that the defendant wanted decedent wife's money, and
prevented her, against her will, from returning tc him. The court held that the
husband's alienation claim should prevail because he had completely lost the comfort
and society of his wife, her aid and assistance in his domestic affairs, and the profit
and advantage he would have gained from her estate .
92. Recompensing parents for shame and dishonor, seduction cases were a
recognized exception to the rule that wounded feelings could not be compensated.
Under the English law fiction of per quod servitium amisit, parents could maintain
an action for the loss of a daughter's "services" caused by her seduction and
pregnancy. When certain cases arose in which the daughter was not living with the
parents, and thus was not in their "service," the courts created a "constructive
service" doctrine based on the parents' right to recall the minor daughter into their
keep at any time, thereby retaining the right to her services. Thus, the courts
endeavored mightily to ensure that parents' moral grief over feminine transgressions
would be compensable. See, e.g., Lavery v. Crooke, 52 Wis. 612 (1881); Phelin v.
Kenderine, 20 Pa. St. 354 (1835); Martin v. Payne, 9 John. 387 (1812); Bedford v.
McKowl, 3 Espinasse 119 (1800).
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essay, in which he vehemently argued for a greater appreciation of a
man's reputation, with scant mention of women except as targets of
social opprobrium for their misdeeds .93
Warren and Brandeis took pains to point out that the loss of
services by female family members was not the only or central point
of the right to recovery in the seduction cases. The doctrine of lost
services, they implied, is a surrogate in the common law for an
unarticulated doctrine akin to the doctrine of privacy they sought to
advance. 94
Women appear in the Warren and Brandeis article as seduced
wives and daughters. They also appear through the memorable image
of a prima donna in tights, "caught on the stage by a camera" - as
the New York Times would report-but spared public mortification
by a judicious court. 95 As noted, one of the specific privacy abuses
that motivated the Warren and Brandeis article was invasive uses of
photography. They thought photographic technology led to unconscionable, indiscriminate exposure to public view. Thus, Warren and
Brandeis cited with approval the 1890 case of Mana/a v. Stevens &
Meyers, in which an actress who had been surreptitiously photographed by her employer while the actress was dressed in tights
successfully enjoined the publication of the photograph. The New
York court granted Marion Manola an ex parte injunction to restrain
the publication of her photograph, "owing to her modesty. " 96 The
defendant never appeared to contest the injunction. 97
While Marion Manola was not within the private precincts of
domestic life at the time the photograph was taken, and had been
openly performing before the public, Warren and Brandeis had no
problem exploiting her case for their argument. For indeed, viewed
in one light, Marion Manola's case was their argument. Warren and
Brandeis could safely assume that most readers conceived of women
as creatures of special modesty. 98 The photographic assault on Man-

93. Godkin, supra note 13, at 60.
94. See Lavery v. Crooke, 52 Wis. 612 (1881); Phelin v. Kenderine, 20 Pa . St.
354 (1835); Martin v. Payn e, 9 John . 387 (1812); Bedford v. McKowl, 3 Espinasse
119 (1800).
95. N.Y. Times, June 15, 1890, at 2, col. 3. See also Warren and Brandeis,
supra note 1, at 193, 195.
96. N.Y . Times, June 15, 1890, at 2, col. 3.
97. Warren and Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195 n. 7.
98. An analysis of men's privacy claims provides an interesting counterpoint
to the argument that gender inequality affected the courts and influenced the outcome
of similar cases in dissimilar ways . In Macken zie v. Soden Mineral Springs Co., 18
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ola's modesty was a paradigm of the kind of privacy invasion they
thought the law ought to have remedied. The appeal to Mana/a was
anything but peripheral to their article's argument. 99 Warren and
Brandeis cited Mana/a as a clear example of judicial protection of
inviolate personality and delicate feelings injured by unwanted publicity. The case was particularly strong for their purposes because it
involved the courts going so far as to protect the residual modesty of
an "undeserving" woman who had behaved immodestly in the first
place and assumed the risk of even broader exposure. If courts must
ascribe privacy rights to a stage actress, then clearly they also must
ascribe privacy rights to ordinary men and women who liv e quietly
and discreetly at home.
C.

COURTS MANAGE MODESTY

In both Mana/a and De May, the courts went remarkably far to
compensate female plaintiffs for privacy losses. The outcome of
another late nineteenth-century case demonstrates a court going to
great lengths to defend a woman's modesty. In Union Pacific Railway
Company v. Botsford, 100 the United States Supreme Court echoed the
sentiment that "the right to one's person" is the right "to be let
alone.'' 101
Mrs. Clara Botsford brought suit against a railroad company for
head injuries she sustained while a passenger. The railroad requested
the trial court to compel Mrs. Botsford to submit to a physical
examination, assuring the court that the examination would be conducted by her personal physician and in such a manner as "not to
expose the person of the plaintiff in any indelicate manner.'' 102 The
court refused the request, Mrs. Botsford received a $10,000 award,
and the. railroad appealed.
The Supreme Court declared that ''the inviolability of the person
is as much invaded by a compulsory stripping and exposure as by a
blow." 103 It reasoned that a person should never be compelled to

N.Y.S. 240 (N.Y . Sup . Ct. 1891), a physician successfully obtained an injunction
against the unauthorized publication of his name in a medicine advertisement.
Although the right to privacy was not discussed by the court, the injunction was
granted under an implied right for the physician "to be let alone." 18 N. Y .S. 240
(1890).
99. But see PEMBER, supra note 7, at 55 (describing Mana/a and DeMay as
"peripheral cases").
100. 141 u.s. 250 (1891).
101. !d. at 251.
102. !d. at 250.
103 . !d. at 250.
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expose her body for the purposes of a civil action, and that any
unreasonable refusal to show injuries would only constitute a fact to
be considered by the jury. Finding, therefore, that the trial court had
no power to compel an examination, the Court affirmed the judgment.
Eleven years later, in the case of Roberson v. Rochester Folding
Box Company, 104 the New York Court of Appeals seemed more
concerned with the orderly growth of the law than with the claims of
modesty. In Roberson, the defendant box company manufactured
and distributed 25,000 copies of an advertisement for flour, each one
bearing plaintiff Roberson's likeness. The advertisements were conspicuously displayed in stores, saloons, warehouses, and other public
areas near Roberson's residence. Miss Roberson, who had not authorized the use of her likeness, complained of humiliation and severe
nervous shock she suffered as the result of the jeers and remarks of
people who recognized her from the advertisements.
Roberson's request for an injunction and damages was granted
by the lower court on the ground that the defendant's unauthorized
publication and circulation of her likeness for profit violated her right
to privacy 105 and her property right in the use of her likeness. 106 In
the appellate division, the judgment was affirmed even though the
court could find no controlling precedent. However, the New York
Court of Appeals reversed the lower court decision by a margin of
four to three. Its principal reasons for the reversal were that (1) there
was no precedent on point, (2) equity could not enjoin the defendant
from merely hurting the plaintiff's feelings, and (3) recognizing a
privacy or property right in a person's face would spawn litigation
and restrict liberty of speech and freedom of the press. The court
mentioned the Warren and Brandeis article, but found its argument
for protecting inviolate personality unconvincing:
104. 65 N.Y.S. 1109, aff'd 64 App. Div. 30, 71 N.Y.S. 876 (1901), rev'd 171
N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902). Cf. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co. , 122 Ga.
190, 50 S.E . 68 (1905) (male plaintiff has privacy right in case against defendant who
appropriated photographic image).
105. Privacy is regarded as a product of civilization, [which] implies an
improved and progressive condition of the people in cultivated manners and
customs with well-defined and respected domestic relations. The privacy of
the home in every civilized country is regarded as sacred, and when it is
invaded it tends to destroy domestic and individual happiness. It seems to
me, therefore, that the extension and development of the law so as to
protect the right of privacy should keep abreast with the advancement of
civilization.
Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 65 N.Y.S. 1109, 1111, aff 'd 64 A.D. 30,
71 N.Y.S. 876 (1901), rev'd 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
106. "Every woman has a right to keep her face concealed from the observation
of the public. Her face is her own private property." !d.
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An examination of the authorities leads us to the conclusion
that the so-called "right of privacy" has not as yet found an
abiding place in our jurisprudence, and . . . the doctrine
cannot now be incorporated without doing violence to settled
principles of law by which the profession and the public have
long been guided. 107
Although Roberson lost her case in the Court of Appeals, the
standard of female modesty prevailed in the court of popular opinion.
The Roberson decision was criticized in the press and by the bar. A
year after the decision, the New York legislature enacted a narrowly
drawn privacy statute, providing a remedy in cases where the name
or picture of a person has been appropriated for commercial advertising purposes. 108 Judge Denis O'Brien, who had concurred in Roberson, was sufficiently perturbed by the public outcry that he wrote
a law review article responding to the criticism. 109 O'Brien asserted
that any harm suffered must have been to Miss Roberson's person or
to her character because a lady has no property right in her form and
features. Property rights in one's visage "would be altogether too
coarse and too material a suggestion to apply to one of the noblest
and most attractive gifts that Providence has bestowed upon the
human race. A woman's beauty, next to her virtues, is her earthly
crown . . . . " 110
One critic of an early privacy case involving the unwanted
publication of a young woman's portrait suggested that the case might
have gone the other way, had the plaintiff been the judge's daughter. 111
This observation underscores the paradox facing women who brought
privacy claims in courts during this period: even when they won, they
did not really win. One way or the other, their claims would be
analyzed and decided according to the conventional perspectives of
the individual judges before whom they appeared. Typical judges were
likely to be strongly influenced by pervasive notions of a need to take
special care to preserve women's modesty as among their chief virtues.

107. Roberson, 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442, 447.
108. Civil Rights Law, Laws of 1903, ch. 132, sec. 2, p. 308.
109. O'Brien, The Right of Privacy, 2 CoLU?>L L. REV . 437 {1902).
110. !d. at 439 .
111. See id. at 437. Judge O ' Brien , however, disagreed , saying "that argument
doubtless has some weight with the 'promiscuous lay public' although it really
imputes to the judges rather a low standard of integrity since it contains the suggestion
that their decisions may be contro lled by their private interests or personal affections . "
!d. at 448 .
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Focussing on the nineteenth-century standard of female modesty
and seclusion presents the Warren and Brandeis article in a new light.
This new focus may help to explain why certain early privacy cases
which seem silly or petty today were brought in the first place, or
why plaintiffs won. We have in mind cases like Atkinson v. John
Doherty & Co., 112 in which a widow sought to enjoin the use of her
deceased husband's name and picture on a cigar label; Schuyler v.
Curtis, 113 in which the erection of a statute in honor of a prominent
woman was protested by her family; Smith v. Doss 114 in which sisters
complained that their notorious father's faked death was republicized
in a radio broadcast; and Peay v. Custis, 11 5 in which a female cab
driver's photo was published in a satirical article about Washington,
D .C. taxis. 116
We also have in mind Kunz v. Allen. 117 In Kunz, a woman who
had been shopping in a dry goods store was filmed by the owners
without her knowledge or consent. The merchants used their film of
her "face, form and garments" 118 to advertise their business in a local
theatre, causing the plaintiff to become ''the common talk of the
people in the community." 119 It was said that people thought "that
she had for hire permitted her picture to be taken and used as a
public advertisement." 120 She brought suit for damages for invasion
of privacy, but the case was dismissed for failure to show actual
damages.
On appeal, the court reversed the judgment, contending that if
strangers were permitted to use a person's pictures without her consent
for advertising purposes, they could exhibit it anywhere: "It may be
posted upon the walls of private dwellings or upon the streets. It may
ornament the bar of the saloonkeeper, or decorate the walls of a
brothel." 121 Because of these lurking dangers, the court agreed that
no one's face and features should be subject to nonconsensual commercial uses and recognized a valid claim for invasion of privacy.
112. 121 Mich. 372, 80 N.W. 285 (1899).
113. 147 N.Y. 434, 42 N.E. 22 (1895).
114. 251 Ala. 250, 37 So. 2d 118 (1948).
115. 78 F. Supp. 305 (D.D.C. 1948).
116. Cf. Milner v. Red River, 249 S.W.2d 227 (1952) (republication of deceased
criminal indictment did not invade survivors' privacy).
117. 102 Kan. 883, 172 P. 532 (1918).
118. Id.
119. Id .
120. Id.
121. Kunz, 102 Kan. at 884, 172 P. 532, 533 (quoting Pavesich v. New England
Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 218, 50 S.E. 68, 80 (1905)).
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Similarly, in Graham v. Baltimore Post Co., 122 the court held
that a woman has a claim for the unauthorized publication of her
picture in a newspaper advertisement. 123 While the judge's expansive
treatment of the development of privacy rights was admirable, he
presented a discriminatory face when he announced that, "the same
act that might well be a violation of the right of privacy, as applied
to a woman, might be dismissed, with legal indifference, as applied
to a man ." 124 He also suggested that the social standing of a female
plaintiff and the media organ would be relevant to her privacy claim,
writing that, "[a] debutante's picture published ... in the social
section of a respectable Sunday supplement, or in certain magazines
... might be unauthorized, but at the same time be unobjectionable
when weighed by accepted standards of propriety ." 125
Drawing from Melvin v. Reid, 126 and echoing Warren and Brandeis' cultivated rhetoric, the judge also announced that disclosure of
the past life of an "otherwise exemplary woman" 127 was actionable
when the story would merely increase readership by ''pandering to
the maudlin curiosity and insatiate appetite of growing debased public
taste." 128 The judge went even further, referring to an east Indian
case in which a neighbor was granted relief against a man who had
built his house so that he could see from his window the neighbor's
wife and daughters when they were unveiled, a disgrace to women
under Hindu custom. 129 From this, the judge referred to the custom
of American widows to wear veils, and asked: "May not a woman,
choosing to withdraw to seclusion, withhold her countenance from
public gaze, even on the street? Has the press any more right to force
her face on the front page, than a photographer would have to lift
her veil on the street and take her photograph?" 130
It is clear that paternalistic, patriarchal concern for feminine
modesty and virtuous seclusion provided the judge with the basis
upon which to rationalize his decision. Later courts and judges often
followed suit, sometimes treating interference with female modesty as

122. (Bait. Super. Ct. 1932), reported in 22 KY . L.J. 108 (1933).
123. !d.
124. !d. at 116.
125 . !d.
126. 112 Cal. App . 285, 297 P . 91 (1931) (film's depiction of former prostitute
invaded her privacy).
127. Graham, 22 KY. L.J. 108, 116.
128 . !d. at 116.
129. !d. at 116-17.
130. !d. at 119.

1990:441)

HOW PRIVACY COT ITS GENDER

465

the paradigm privacy tort. 13 1 Some courts, like the court in Graham,
explicitly acknowledged that the sex of the plaintiff is relevant to
liability in privacy cases. 132
IV.

A.

THR O UGH A WOMAN'S EYES

Published in 1890, the Warren and Brandeis article prescribed a
legal right to a private home and family life that included rights
protecting female modesty and seclusion. But 1890 was the year of

131. See, e.g., Bennett v. Norban , 396 Pa. 94, 99, !51 A.2d 476, 479 (1959)
(" If a modest young girl should be set upon by ... ruffians who did not touch her
but by threats compelled her to undress, give them her clothes, and flee naked
through the streets, it could not be doubted that her privacy had been invaded as
well as her clothes stolen. " ) (emphasis added) .
132. Graham, 22 KY. L.J. 108, 116 (1933); see also Barber v. Time, Inc., 348
Mo . 1199, !59 S.W.2d 291, 294 (1942) .
The argument that gender bias has affected the reasoning or outcome of privacy
cases is strengthened by comparing early women's privacy cases with early cases in
which men claimed violations of their privacy rights. Warren and Brandeis defended
spirituality or personality, not reputation and property, as the essence of the privacy
tort. Nevertheless, courts emphasized the inherent or economic importance of reputation, good name, and community standing in men's privacy cases. See, e.g.,
MacKenzie v. Soden Mineral Springs Co., 18 N.Y.S. 240 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1891) (male
physician successfully enjoined unauthorized publication of name in medicine adverti sement); Marks v. Jaffa, 6 Misc. 290, 26 N.Y.S. 908 (N.Y. Sup . Ct. 1893)
(unauthorized publication of man's name and picture in newspaper enjoined); Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co ., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E . 68 (1905) (artist sought
damages for unauthorized us e of his photograph in advertisement); Edison v. Edison
Polyform Mfg. Co . , 73 N.J. Eq. 136, 67 A. 392 (Ch. 1907) (action to enjoin use of
name and likeness on medi cine label and advertisements); Foster-Milburn Co. v.
Chinn, 134 Ky. 424, 120 S.W . 364 (1909) (senator sues over unauthorized use of
name and likeness in medicine advertisement); Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652,
134 S.W. 1076 (1911) (action for unauthorized publication of boy's picture in
advertisement) ; State ex rei. La Follette v. Hinkle, 131 Wash . 86, 229 P. 317 (1924)
(politician successfully enjoin ed use of his name by unaffiliated group).
Although reputational and economic concerns loomed large in early men's
privacy cases, injuries to sensibilities were not wholly ignored. See, e.g., Ma rks v.
Jaffa, 6 Misc. 290, 26 N .Y.S . 908, 909 (N .Y. Sup . Ct. 1893) ("Private rights must
be respected, as well as the wishes and sensibilities of people."). But in men's cases,
rhetorical appeal to a need for social standing and property was typically more
pronounced than rhetorical appeals to feelings and sensibilities . Moreover, the
sensibilities referred to in men' s cases were never overtly or intentionally gendered as
masculine traits. And finally, modesty concerns, so prevalent in women's cases, were
virtually absent in the men's cases .
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the New Woman, the Gibson Girl. 133 By then, women were coming
to realize that they had had too much of the wrong kinds of privacy.
Affluent, urban women sensed that they had been confined for too
long to the "private sphere" of domestic and caretaking roles. As
wives and mothers, women typically lacked the solitude and peace of
mind which privacy romantics like Warren and Brandeis associated
with homelife. Women also lacked privacy in the controversial sense
of decisional autonomy over marriage, sex, and reproduction. Cloaked
behind conventions of modesty and retreat, women had enjoyed few
meaningful forms of personal privacy.
Warren and Brandeis published an article that was deeply conventional and conservative when it came to gender. Far from privacy
revolutionaries, they were men of their times whose essay presents a
certain elitist, patriarchic view of privacy's importance. When it came
to women's privacy, the Warren and Brandeis article lacked vision.
A good way to make this point stick is to compare the Warren
and Brandeis article to a book written in the same decade by the
utopian feminist Charlotte Perkins Gilman. 134 Begun in 1888, two
years before Bostonians Warren and Brandeis published The Right to
Privacy from nearby Cambridge, Massachusetts, Women and
Economics 135 was published in Boston in 1898. Gilman may not have
read The Right to Privacy, but she devoted a chapter of her book to
exploding myths the Warren and Brandeis article enshrined. Women
and Economics had an ''immediate and enormous impact on radical
and reform writers and critics,'' elevating Gilman into the position of
a leading intellectual of the women's movement. 136
The subject of Gilman's book is American women's predominant
role in the expanding industrial economy. Women, she said, are
domestic toilers, economically dependent upon men for their necessities, luxuries, and status. 137 Denied free productive expression, 138 sex133. Cj. R. RosENBERG, BEYOND SEPARATE SPHERES 54 (1982) (By 1890 American
magazine writers could point to the "New Woman," the physical, extroverted,
independent woman with ambitions that included a life outside home.); L. BANNER,
supra note 47 at 21-22 (New Women , typified by Charles Dana Gibson's artistic
depictions in a series of Life magazine drawings, were praised by feminists and both
praised and derided by the press.). See also C. SMITH-ROSENBERG, DISORDERLY
CONDUCT 46 (1985) .
134. See A. LANE, To HERLAND AND BEYOND: THE LIFE AND WoRK OF CHARLOTTE PERKINS GILMAN (1990) .
135. C. GILMAN, supra note 10. The book was originally published under the
name Charlotte Perkins Stetson. Gilman later remarried and again changed her name.
136. A. LANE supra note 134, at 253 .
137. C. GILMAN, supra note 10, at 18-22.
138. !d. at 117-118.
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distinction and attraction are women's means of "getting a livelihood." 139 While men expend their energies in "struggle in the marketplace as in a battlefield, " 140 women overestimate the so-called
duties of their position and overconsume goods and services. 14 1 The
resulting "sexuo-economic" relation of man and woman debases
female character, commercializes love, and dampens family feeling. 142
Looking to the future, Gilman predicted that, "[t]he free woman,
having room for full expression in her economic activities and in her
social relation, will not be forced so to pour out her soul in tidies
and photograph holders. The home will be her place of rest, not of
uneasy activity." 143
Gilman offered a traditional proverb to summarize her estimation
of women's lot: "A woman should leave her home but three timeswhen she is christened, when she is married, and when she is buried." 144 The condition of women is "confinement to the four walls of
the home," 145 and yet confinement limits women's ideas, information,
thought-processes, and powers of judgment. "[O]nly as we live, think,
feel, and work outside the home, do we become humanely developed,
civilized and socialized." 146
The subject of privacy arises in Women and Economics as a
powerful myth and ideal of homelife. The "privacy of the home,"
she wrote, is the reason given for limiting women to domestic roles.
The popular assumption is that homes are crucial preserves of personal
privacy. Someone must maintain them, and women have that role.
To undercut the privacy argument for female confinement, Gilman
made a number of realistic counter-arguments. She contended that,
to a remarkable degree, our homes are not as private as we like to
think . 147 If we are affluent, our homes are filled with servants and
service providers who inevitably learn our closest secrets. 148 Family

139. !d. at 38.
140. !d. at I 19.
141. !d. at 119-120.
142. !d. at 121.
143. !d. at 257.
144. !d. at 65. Gilman offered another telling proverb: "The woman, the cat
and the chimney should never leave the house." !d.
145. !d.
146. !d. at 222.
147. !d. at 258-260 ("The home is the one place on earth where no one of the
component individuals can have any privacy. A family is a crude aggregate of persons
of different ages, sizes, sexes, and temperaments, held together by sex-ties and
economic necessity .... ").
148. Of all popular paradoxes, none is more markedly absurd than to hear
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homes without servants are also no guarantors of true privacy,
especially in the case of women, who face special obstacles to meaningful privacy . 149 Moreover, the urban poor cannot afford the kinds
of homes that answer the privacy needs of family members. Their
crowded lives are "distinctly degrading ." 150
One of Gilman's proposed solutions to women's special privacy
problems as "dependent mother, servant wife" 15 1 was for families to
take their meals away from home or collaborate on meals to provide
good food more efficiently . 152 Whatever the solution, the important
point for Gilman was that women's lack of meaningful opportunities
for individual privacy is tied to their economic role. To have real
privacy, women would have to be freed from their limited role in the
economy as mere housekeepers and mothers. But Gilman did not
reject family, "home comforts," and intimacy as such. She simply
argued for norms of privacy and private life that permit for women
no less than for men "the highest development of personality" 153
consistent with "the society of those dear to us." 154
us prate of privacy in a place where we cheerfully admit to our table-talk
and to our door service-yes, and to the making of our beds and to the
handling of our clothing-a complete stranger ... .
!d. at 255.
Xenophobia can be seen in Gilman's mentioning the possibilities that one's
servant might be of "an alien race" and worse, "a stranger by breeding." !d. at
256. Gilman was not always above the class, race, and sex prejudices of her day.
149. The progressive individuation of human beings requires a personal
home, one room each for each person .... [F]or the vast majority of the
population, no such provision is possible. To women, especially, a private
room is a luxury of the rich alone .... At present any tendency to withdraw
and live one's own life on any plane of separate interest or industry is
naturally resented, or at least regretted by the other members of the family.
This affects women more than men, because men live very little in the
family and very much in the world .... [T]he women and children live in
the home-because they must. For a woman to wish to spend time elsewhere
is considered wrong, and the children have no choice .... Yet the home
ties bind us with a gentle dragging hold that few can resist. Those who do
resist, and who insist upon living their individual lives find that this costs
them loneliness and privation; and they lose so much in daily comfort and
affection that others are deterred from following them.
!d. at 258, 259-60.
150. Jd. at 258 ("The effects of such grouping on modern people is known in
the tenement districts of large cities, where families live in single rooms; and these
effects are of a distinctly degrading nature.") .
151. !d. at 262.
152. !d. at 225-270.
153 . !d. at 260.
154. !d. at 260, 271.
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Warren and Brandeis' sentimental attachment to the privacy of
the home takes on an interesting complexion in view of Gilman's
claim that it is one of the great "fatuous absurdities, mere dangling
relics of outgrown tradition, slowly moulting from us as we grow.'' 155
Granted, Gilman might have agreed that the press, gossip, and
photography pose serious threats to modesty and feelings. She might
have agreed with Godkin that reputational damage is a troublesome
consequence of many privacy invasions. But she clearly would have
eschewed uncritical appeal to the "privacy of the home" and "inviolate personality" as co-rationalizations for a new legal privacy right.
\Vhat good is ''inviolate personality'' when one is female and not
permitted the "highest development of personality?" How can private
and domestic life be sacred precincts, if one cannot escape them or
disaggregate oneself within them?
B.

FIRST CENTURY THEORY

Over one hundred years after the Warren and Brandeis article,
legal discussions of the privacy tort are largely silent about the social
reality of gender bias and its impact on privacy law. Gender-conscious
discussion of privacy has been too often relegated to constitutional
law and to the abortion debate, where conceptual controversies about
the application of "privacy" make fruitful inquiry difficult. 156 Privacy
tort scholars have consistently overlooked concern about women's
privacy as a force in the development of the privacy tort. Scholars
seldom focus squarely on the possibility that gender may have a role
in explaining the shape of precedent.
Kim Scheppele's comparison of Sidis v. F-R Publishing Co. 157
and Melvin v. Reid158 is illustrative. 159 These two influential cases have
analogous facts and different putcomes. They thus represent a special
explanatory challenge to Scfieppele's excellent effort to present a
unified, contractarian, descriptive theory of the law of privacy and
secrecy.

l

\

I

L

154.
155.
156.
REV . 461
157.
158.
159.

!d. at 260, 271.
!d. at 248.
Allen, Privacy, Private Choice and Social Contract Theory, 56 CrN. L.
(1987).
113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940).
112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931).
K. ScHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS 218-19 n.45 (1988).
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As an eleven year old, Willi am James Sidis had been a prodigy
in mathematics. 160 A reporter for the New Yorker discovered that
Sidis the adult worked as a clerk and lived in a tiny, run-down
apartment. After an article disclosing these facts was published in the
magazine's "Where Are They Now?" feature, Sidis sued for invasion
of privacy. He lost. The plaintiff in Melvin v. Reid161 was a former
prostitute and one-time murder suspect. She won her case, claiming
that the film "The Red Kimono " told her life story , using her actual
maiden name in violation of her pr ivacy rights. Finding in her favor,
the court stressed that the plaintiff had become a housewife and now
" lived an exemplary, virtuous, honorable and righteous life ." 162
Why did the former prostitute prevail and the child prodigy lose?
How can the two cases be squ ared? Scheppele struggled to
give an account of why Sidis lost his case and Melvin won hers. 16 3 A
possibility Scheppele failed to draw out is that the gender of the
plaintiffs made a crucial difference to the perceived seriousness of
unwanted publicity. Viewed in social context, the woman who wished
to conceal a past of prostitution may have presented a more compelling claim than the man who wanted to conceal that he had failed to
have the brilliant career anticipated, precisely because she was a
woman and he was a man.
It is impossible to rule out attitudes about gender in accounting
for judicial behavior. But it does not follow that the courts' attitudes
about gender are always salient features of privacy cases. Nor does it
follow that the outcome of tort cases can be wholly explained or
predicted by reference to gender and attitudes about it. In fact, our
examination of privacy cases, including the cases state and federal
courts have used as vehicles for recognizing privacy torts, suggests
the contrary. In many cases in which plaintiffs were women, gender
appears to have been of little significance to the existence, reasoning,
or outcome of the cases. 164
160. Sidis v. F-R Publi shing Co ., 113 F .2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311
U.S. 711 (1940).
161. 112 Cal. App . 285, 297 P. 9 1 (1 931) .
162. !d. a t 286.
163. It may seem diffi cult to squ a re Melvin with Sid is since in bo th of th em
the subjects' unique and vi sibl e pasts made identification [i.e ., use of their
real names] reason able . P erhaps th e di fference lies in the degree of harm
caused by the connection in the persons ' present life with the person's past
deeds. Sidis was being identified with a praiseworthy past while Melvin was
being identified with a discredit a ble past. As was mentioned earlier, .. .
publicizing information that puts the subj ect in a good light does not seem
to be actionable .
K. SCHEPPELE , LEGAL SECRETS, at 218-19 n.45 (198 8).
164. See, e.g., Norman v. City of Las Vegas, 64 Nev. 38, 177 P.2d 442 (1947)
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Yet, for better or worse, concern for the boundaries of women's
privacy has played a significant role in establishing and shaping legal
precedent for the right of privacy. Cases involving characteristically
female experiences, such as childbirth, 165 objectification by reason of
beauty, 166 sexual harassment in the workplace, 167 breach of confidentiality in the welfare system, 168 rape publicity, 169 and adoption 170 have
contributed to shaping state and federal doctrine and clarifying the
meaning of legal privacy. Future privacy scholars mu st consider gender
as they seek to explain the dimensions, successes, and failures of the
privacy tort.
The relevance of gender is now widely discussed by legal scholars
in many fi elds of public and private law, including, to a limited
extent, tort law. But privacy tort scholars have not yet exploited the
lllumination-and the justice-gender sensitive analysis of the law
potentially generates. We have already argued that Blaustein misread
De lvfay in his attempt to establish generic human dignity as the
normative basis of all privacy law protections. Blaustein went astray
when he sought to explain the past without acknowledging the significance of gender. Adding insult to injury, he posited a future class of
aspiring Cinderellas who will delight in uninvited publicity and therefore have weak damage claims. 171

(requirement of police photographing and fingerprinting of liquor industry workers
not an invasion of privacy); Eick v. Perk Dog Food, 347 Ill. App . 293, 106 N.E.2d
742 (1952) (blind girl's photo used without consent in connection with advertising
campaign) .
Female gender may have had a subtle role in privacy cases like Reed v. Ponton,
15 Mich .App . 423, 166 N.W.2d 629 (1968) and Hendry v. Connor, 303 Minn. 317,
226 N.W .2d 921 (1975), since women were more likely to shop, tend to sick children,
and be poor. Male gender was not an irrelevant feature of Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, 72
N.J. Eq. 910, 67 A. 97 (Ct. Err. & App . 1907) (man alleged that use of his name on
his putative child's birth certificate invaded his privacy).
165. De May v. Roberts, 46 Mich. 160, 9 N.W . 146 (1881) .
166. Roberson v. Rochester Folding-Box, 32 Misc. 344, 65 N.Y.S. 1109 (1900),
ajj'd, 64 A.D. 30, 71 N.Y.S. 876 (1901) , rev 'd, 171 N .Y. 53 8, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
167 . Phillips v. Smalley Mainten ance Services, 435 So . 2d 705 (Ala. 1983) .
168. Harris by Harris v. Easton Pub. Co., 335 Pa. Super. 141, 483 A.2d 1377
(Pa. Super. 1984) .
169. Hubbard v. Journal Publishing Co ., 69 N.M. 473, 368 P.2d 147 (1962);
Cox Broadcasti ng v. Cohn, 420 U.S . 469 (1975); B.F.J . v. Florida Star, 109 S.Ct.
2603 (1989) .
170. Humphers v. First Interstate Bank, 298 Or. 706 , 696 P .2d 527 (1985).
171. " Undoubtedly, there will be cases in which the publication of a name
or likeness without consent is a boon and not a burden. Rather than
suffering humiliation and degradation as a result, the beautiful but unknown
girl pictured on the cover of a nationally circulated phonograph record
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An insightful article by Robert Post 172 is nonetheless disappointing
for reasons not unlike the reasons that the Warren and Brandeis
article is disappointing. To his credit, Post observed that "care must
be taken in evaluating the universalist pretensions of the tort of
intrusion." 173 He further warned that, "[u]nder conditions of cultural
heterogeneity, the common law can become a powerful instrument
for effacing cultural and normative differences." 174 Yet, his article
which purported to describe the interplay between communities and
selves, omitted women's social experiences. The article blind-sides
both the specific respects in which the traditional family and the
mother-child relationship pose special challenges for the concept of
the home as a socially defined precinct of privacy, and the role that
concern for women has played in the development of the normative
foundations of the privacy torts.
Post maintained "the common law tort of invasion of privacy
offers a rich and complex apprehension of the texture of social life
in America." 175 But his article failed to depict that texture as it
pertains to women's characteristic social experiences. This is especially
problematic in the face of the argument that women are more prone
to certain kinds of privacy invasions inside and outside the home than
are men. 176 Moreover, had Post analyzed the case law and doctrine
with a keen eye toward cultural differences of gender, he might have
reached some different theoretical conclusions.
Take, for example, his claim that in the case of intrusion, privacy
rules can enable individuals to receive and express intimacy. 177 Post

might be delighted at having been transfigured into a modern Cinderella .
Suddenly, she is a national figure, glowing in the limelight, and her picture
and name have become sought after commodities as a result. Has privacy
been violated when there is no personal sense of indignity and the commercial
values of name or likeness have been enhanced rather than diminished?
I believe that in such a case there is an invasion of privacy, although it
is obviously not one which will be sued on and not one which is liable to
evoke community sympathy or command anything but a nominal jury
award."
Bloustein, supra note 65, at 990 .
172. Post, supra note 11.
173. !d. at 977.
174. !d.
175. !d. at 959.
176. For several reasons, women are arguably more prone to privacy invasions
when they leave their homes for work or recreation. First, the absence of effective
sanctions against harassment and women's roles as inferiors and ancillaries emboldens
intruders; second, the assumption that women are limited by their obligations permits
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could not have been contemplating the cases involving sexual harassment and public searches of women styled as intrusion cases by the
courts. In Bennett v. Norban, 178 a woman suspected but innocent of
shoplifting was accosted in a parking lot by a retailer's employee who
searched her pockets and handbag. The court held in her favor, as it
did in the recent case of a maintenance worker whose boss pressed
her for private facts about her sex life. 179 The privacy rules of intrusion
in these cases most directly enable individuals to reject, not receive
intimacy-and to refuse, not express it. In fact, the privacy tort as
applied to women has often functioned to reinforce the social rules
of inaccessibility applicable to females. Because he was blind to
gender, Post seemed unaware of key dimensions of how privacy rights
function in the social realm.

v.
A pair of employment-related cases decided in the 1980s protected
women's privacy interests but avoided outmoded conceptions of female modesty and domesticity. 180 In the first case, a self-described shy
and modest woman subjected to egregious privacy invasions relied on
the "outrageous conduct" tort to defeat a summary judgment motion.
In the second case, a woman's damage award for wrongs that included
one of Prosser's four privacy torts-"unreasonable intrusion upon
the seclusion of another'' -survived an appeal. 181 Neither case suggested that all women have heightened sensibilities or that protecting
women's privacy is of special importance to guarding their virtue or
gender roles. Far from relying upon the assumption that women

easy rationalization of prying into their affairs; and third, the higher expectations of
moral conduct to which they are held encourages both surveillance and exposure. See
A. ALLEN, supra note 11, at 141. A significant body of privacy tort law deals with
women's problems enjoying privacy in public places such as restrooms, fitting rooms,
dressing rooms, hospitals, the workplace, and on the streets. See id. at 123-152
(discussing cases).
177. /d. at 19.
178. 396 Pa. 94, 151 A.2d 476 (1959) .
179. Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Services, 435 So. 2d 705 (Ala. 1983).
180. Bodewig v. K-Mart, 54 Or.App . 480, 635 P.2d 657 (1981); Phillips v.
Smalley Maintenance Services, 435 So . 2d 705 (Ala. 1983) .
181. See Prosser, supra note 83, at 383. See also RESTATEME NT (SECOND) OF
ToRTS § 652(b) (1977) ("One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise,
upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject
to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person.").
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belong at home, or that women who venture into the public realm of
private employment "get what they deserve," these cases implied that
women who choose to work outside the home are entitled to working
conditions free of highly offensive intrusions.
A.

STRIP SEARCHING THE CAS HIER

Linda Bodewig instituted a tort action for "outrageous conduct"
in Oregon state court against her former employer, K-Mart, Inc., and
a K-Mart customer, Alice Golden. 182 The suit stemmed from an
incident in which K-Mart employees and Golden persistently accused
Bodewig of theft and forced her to undergo a strip search. The
defendants' motions for summary judgment on the grounds of consent
and justification were granted by the trial court, but reversed on
appeal. The case was remanded for trial.
In March 1979, Bodewig was a part-time cashier at one of KMart's discount department stores. She was ringing up Alice Golden's
purchases when a dispute arose over the price of a pair of window
curtains. While Golden went to investigate curtain prices, Bodewig
moved her purchases to a customer service desk and began checking
out another customer. 183
When Golden returned, she insisted that she had left $20 in cash
with her purchases at the register. Bodewig denied any knowledge of
the money. The ensuing commotion led the store's thirty-two year old
male manager to intervene. The manager's search of the check-out
area, Bodewig's pockets, and the cash register turned up no evidence
of error or theft. Golden still contended that Bodewig had taken her
money. 184
The manager then asked Bodewig to disrobe in the public restroom in view of a female assistant manager and Golden to prove that
she had not taken the money. Bodewig complied. Even after the strip
search uncovered no money, Golden continued to accuse Bodewig. 185
On her return to work the next day, Bodewig was told that her
register keys had been lost, and that she would have to work on the
register with another clerk. Believing that the store was using this
stigmatizing procedure to monitor her, Bodewig quit her job at the
end of her shift. 186

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Bodewig v. K-Mart, 54 Or.App. 480, 635 P.2d 657 (1981).
635 P .2d at 659.
!d.
!d.
!d. at 660.
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The fact s of Bodewig provided a compelling picture of a young
woman, who described herself as modest and shy, subjected to a
humiliating strip search by her employer and an accuser. Yet, to its
credit, the court did not resort to a circa 1890-style female modesty
analysis of the intrusion.
The court determined that K-Mart's employer-employee relationship with Bodewig made it liable for reckless behavior that was
" beyond the limits of social toleration." 187 The humiliating and
degrading experience, conducted at the direction of a manager who
had already ascertained that Bodewig had not taken the money and
who only ordered the search to prove this to a customer, rose to the
level of actionable outrageous conduct. The court rejected, as a matter
of law, K-Mart's claim that Bodewig had consented to the strip
search. The manager's position of power to hire and fire may have
led Bodewig to believe she had no choice but to go along with his
request.
The appeals court found no special relationship between Golden
and Bodewig . It nevertheless held that Golden could be liable for
"outrageous conduct" if a trier of fact found that Golden's having
persistently accused Bodewig was deliberate, socially intolerable, and
the proximate cause of emotional distress. 188
The right to privacy doctrines spawned by Warren and Brandeis,
and restated by Prosser, played no role in Bodewig. But the case
plainly involved vindication of privacy-related interests through the
law. In Bodewig, the outrageous conduct tort did the work a privacy
tort might have done, and in a way that avoided gender stereotyping.
B.

SEXUALLY HARASSING THE JANITOR

In Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance, 189 the privacy tort itself does
the work. Brenda Phillips sued her employer in federal court for
invasion of privacy and violations of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Phillips claimed she had been wrongfully discharged from her position
with a maintenance services firm, in violation of Title VII 's sex
discrimination proscriptions, after she refused to answer questions
about sex and to perform oral sex. The trial court awarded damages
and the defendant appealed. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit certified
to the Supreme Court of Alabama questions about the scope of state
common law raised by Phillips' pendent privacy invasion claims. In

187. !d. at 661.
188. !d.
189. Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance, 435 So.2d 705 (Ala. 1983).

476

NORTHER N IL LINOIS UNIVER SITY LAW RE VIEW

[Vo l. 10

holding that the facts of the Phillips' case supported a claim for
invasion of privacy, the court did not focus on fem ale modesty. Like
the Oregon C ourt of A ppeals in Bodewig , the Alabama court depicted
the plaintiff as a virtual economic prison er and thus highly susceptible
to her em ployer's o ffensi ve demands.
Shortly a fter Phillips started work as an "overhead cleaner " for
Ray Small ey, he began calling her into his offi ce severa l times a week.
Each time he would lock the door and pose questions ab out her sex
li f e . Knowin g that h er fam ily wa s "s ignific a ntl y financially
dependent " 190 on her sala ry , Smalley in sis ted that P hil lip s have oral
sex with him or risk losing her job. O nce, when Phillips forced her
way out o f his office, Smalley hit her " across the bottom" with his
hand. 191 A ft er a stressful encounter with Smalley, P hillips one day
left work early. Wh en she attempted to return , the defe nda nt informed
her that she had been " laid off, " and she was presented a final pay
check. 192
P hillips ' eventual Title VII and privacy invasion action alleged
damages for chronic anxiety and disruption of family personal relations. The trial court awarded $2,666.40 in damages for lost wages ,
$10 for battery, and $25,000 for privacy invasion.
In its consideration of the privacy invasion claim, the Supreme
Court of Alabama focused on the intentional and highly offensive
intrusion into Phillips' solitude, seclusion, and private affairs. Relying
upon the analysis of privacy rights contained in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts 193 and case law, 194 the court held that Smalley's
assault on Phillips' "personality" or "psychological integrity" was
actionable. The court reasoned that Smalley's actions easily qualified
as intrusion upon seclusion even though he did not act surreptitiously,
publicize Phillips ' private affairs to third parties, or get the sexual
information and sex he demanded. 195 In reaching this conclusion, the
court recognized that " Smalley , aware of the importance to Plaintiff
of her regular income, rendered her , in effect , an 'economic prisoner .'''1 96
190 . Id . at 707.
19 1. Id .
192. !d.
193 . RESTATEME NT (SECOND) OF T ORTS § 652B (1977).
194 . E.g . , Eisen stadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 43 8 (1972) (s tate statute making it illegal
to distribute contraceptives to unmarried persons found to be in violation o f the
Equal Protectio n Clause); Griswold v . Connecti cut, 381 U .S . 479 (1965) (fundamental
rights entitled to privacy protection); Bennett v. Norban, 396 Pa . 94 , 151 A .2d 476
(1959) (serious interference with anonymity and unreasonable intrusi o n).
195. Phillips v. Smalley , 435 So. 2d at 711 (Ala . 1983).
196. Id.
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T he future of the common law privacy tort at tim es appears
uncertain. 197 Bodewig suggests that at least some priv acy interests
could be pro tected through actions for emotional distress . But if the
privacy t ort survives as a distinct cause of action , perhaps we shall
increasingly observe in women's cases the break with the past that is
evident in the language of Phillips . In both Bodewig and Phillip s,
women satisfactorily performing employment duties were subjected to
gross invasions of their privacy by employers wh o exercised economic
and psych ological control over them . Recog nizing th at the abuse lay
in a deni al of the right to invasion-free employment rather than in
offended virtue alone, the courts properly resolved the issues by
emphasizing the right to work and not gender- biased claims o f fe male
mod esty.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Warren and Brandeis article initiated a doctrinal revolution
tort law. But the article was business as usual when it came to
gender. In the nineteenth century , popular views concerning women ' s
limited capacities, proper role, and special virtues were reflected in
legislation and court opinions. The law of marriage and family
contributed to the problem of women's privacy within the home. That
problem was the problem of too much of the wrong kinds of privacytoo much modesty, seclusion, reserve and compelled intimacy-and
too little individual modes of personal privacy and autonomous,
private choice.
Warren and Brandeis ' plea for a right to privacy criticized
interference with home life, personality, and modesty stemming from
unwanted publicity and circulation of photographs. Unlike their contemporary, Charlotte Perkins Gilman, Warren and Brandeis were not
critical of the ways in which homelife, assertions of masculine personality, and norms of female modesty contributed to women's
lacking autonomous decisionmaking and meaningful forms of individual privacy. From the perspective of Gilman ' s feminism, Warren and
Brandeis' version of the right to privacy was approaching obsolescence
at its inception.
The first century of privacy law scholarship launched by W arren
and Brandeis has produced increasingly sophisticated analyses . Continuing the trend, we must hope that the next century also produces
careful scholarly analyses of the role that attitudes about gender have
played in the development of privacy law. We must hope also that
courts will turn self-consciously to the gender factor in privacy tort

111

197. See generally Zimmerman , supra note 86.
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cases. Early jurists sometimes did so, but with an eye toward protecting their patriarchic visions of feminine modesty and domesticity.
Future courts adjudicating privacy claims have an opportunity to
focus on gender in new and better ways . A few have already done
so. Today, women's predominate social status as ancillaries and
inferiors gives rise to egregious losses of privacy, thoughtlessly or
maliciously inflicted. 198 The privacy tort is potentially a vehicle for
legitimating women's claims for peace of mind, dignitarian respect,
and fair employment.

198. Women's privacy is an important but not consummate end. It can be
problematically disregarded by the courts. See Yoekel v. Samonig, 272 Wis. 430, 75
N.W.2d 925 (Wis. 1956) (woman photographed using toilet in bar failed to recover
in privacy action). But women's privacy can be reasonably placed second to business
and economic concerns. See Lewis v. Dayton, 128 Mich .App. 165, 339 N.W.2d 857
(1983). Lewis shows that women's modesty is not the all consuming interest it once
was. The court in Lewis held that there was no invasion of privacy where a retailer
had posted signs warning customers that fitting rooms were under surveillance to
deter theft.

